This study analyzes the relationship between discriminatory social attitudes and the variation of within-firm pay gaps by combining data on regional votes on gender equality laws with a data set of multi-establishments firms and their workers. The data set allows us for the first time to study gender pay gaps within the same firm across establishments located in regions with varying discriminatory social attitudes. Our results show that firms have larger pay gaps in regions with stronger discriminatory social attitudes. This result remains robust when we account for detailed worker and job characteristics and prevails for different subsamples.
Introduction
A number of recent empirical studies find evidence for a persistent and strong relationship between discriminatory social attitudes and gender (or racial) pay gaps. These gaps prevail even after accounting for detailed individual characteristics such as education, occupation, and marital status (e.g., Charles and Guryan 2008; Charles, Guryan, and Pan 2009; Fortin 2005) . Therefore, the authors typically interpret these results as evidence that social attitudes stipulate discriminatory pay gaps.1 However, such results could also be explained by the decision of women themselves. If women respond to discriminatory social attitudes by following more traditional gender roles, the relationship between discriminatory social attitudes and gender pay gaps may be a consequence of women self-selecting into different types of firms. Women who follow traditional gender roles may prefer firms with family-friendly work practices that offer lower wages, may invest less in job search, or prefer low commuting costs over high wages (e.g., Bender, Donohue, and Heywood 2005; Heywood, Siebert and Wei 2007; Keith and McWilliams 1999; Pissarides and Wadsworth 1994) . As prior studies did not account for the unobserved heterogeneity of firms, it remains unclear whether women who are exposed to discriminatory attitudes indeed receive lower wages than comparable male coworkers or whether those women simply work in firms that pay lower wages to all their workers. Thus it remains unclear how differences in discriminatory attitudes translate into wage gaps.
Our paper contributes to the literature by studying gender wage gaps within firms but across establishments that are located in regions with distinct differences in discriminatory social attitudes. Doing so helps us to narrow down the number of explanations given in the previous literature. Thus far, few data sources have allowed researchers to observe variation in discriminatory attitudes within firms. Most studies rely on individual cross-section data without firm information, data that does not allow them to examine the effect of firms' wagesetting behavior. Therefore, we create a unique and innovative data source of multiestablishment firms that operate in one country but in different regions, whose workers are therefore exposed to different levels of discriminatory attitudes towards gender equality.
The advantage of our data is that it allows us to observe the wages and employment of different establishments that act under precisely the same national regulations and technological standards (because they operate during the same period in the same country, the same industry, and the same firm), but that are exposed to the influence of differing social attitudes (because these establishments are located in different regions with different social attitudes towards gender equality).
To measure discriminatory social attitudes, we use two Swiss referenda on gender equality rights, both of which provide valid and highly reliable indicators. First, we follow Lalive and Stutzer (2010) by using information on regional votes on a 1981 amendment to the Swiss constitution on equal rights for women and men. Second, we use information on regional votes on a 2000 amendment to the Swiss constitution, stating that women should be fairly represented in the Federal administration. The outcomes of both referenda reliably measure regional differences in discriminatory social attitudes, because voters tend to reveal their true prejudices in secret votes with real legal consequences. We match the regional voting outcomes with the regional data of multi-establishments firms.
The main findings of the paper are the following: First, we find a relatively large within-firm relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and the size of gender pay gaps across regions. The result prevails, even if we account for detailed observable worker and job characteristics. Moreover, we find no evidence that the regional sorting of firms with larger pay gaps in more discriminatory regions explains the within-firm correlation between discriminatory attitudes and firms' gender pay gaps. As a consequence, our results suggest that-within the same firms-gender pay gaps are larger for branches in regions with more discriminatory attitudes than in regions with less discriminatory attitudes, i.e., the gender pay gap is larger in establishments in a region where more people tolerate gender inequality than in a region where fewer people tolerate gender inequality.
Second, different industries may be exposed to different levels of product market concentration, which is likely to be a main determinant for an employer's potentials to discriminate against women (e.g., Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske 2002) . Therefore, we also provide a separate analysis for broad industry classes, finding the largest effect for the manufacturing sector, followed by commerce sector and the banking sector. In comparison to other industries in Switzerland, the manufacturing industry is characterized by a much higher market concentration and larger barriers to entry. Thus the results are consistent with the idea that a firm's product market power mitigates the relationship between social attitudes and 4 gender pay gaps.
We thus show that discriminatory attitudes are related to larger gender pay gaps, even after we account for both the unobserved heterogeneity of firms and observable worker and job characteristics. Therefore, our results suggest that the sorting of women and men into different firms, occupations, and jobs alone cannot account for the relationship between social attitudes and gender pay gaps. In other words, women indeed appear to earn lower wages than comparable male coworkers in regions where more people oppose gender equality rights.
Thus our results support a number of theories involving the discriminatory behavior of employers, manager, coworkers, or customers. If social attitudes, for example, stipulate the discriminatory tastes of local managers or customers, firms should pay more discriminatory wages in regions where more people oppose gender equality. To strategically adjust the paysetting to the local discriminatory environment may even be efficient for firms if markets are not perfectly competitive (e.g., Lang and Lehmann 2012; Rosén 1997) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section I describes the theoretical background. Section II presents the empirical model. Section III describes the voting and the firm data. Section IV presents the estimation results. Section V concludes.
I. Why should social attitudes influence the pay-setting behavior of firms?
A variety of mechanisms may cause a relationship between social attitudes toward gender equality and firms' pay-setting behavior. To provide the theoretical framework for the interpretation of our results, we now discuss the three main channels presented in the literature: (1) employer discrimination, i.e., social attitudes toward gender equality shape the discriminatory behavior of employers and managers and their consequent pay-setting patterns;
(2) customer and coworker discrimination, i.e., social attitudes shape the behavior of customers and coworkers, who are therefore more or less tolerant towards discrimination; and (3) inequality due to individual preferences, i.e., social attitudes change the individual worker's preferences and behavior.
Employer discrimination
The most prominent theory for explaining the relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and the pay-setting behavior of firms is the theory of "taste-based discrimination" (Becker 1971 ). Becker's theory argues that employers, coworkers, or customers have a certain taste for discriminating against women. If utility-maximizing employers or managers have distastes for hiring women, they are willing to hire women only for a wage below their productivity. However, the employers' taste for discrimination comes at a cost: Non-discriminatory firms can collect rents by hiring women for wages slightly above discriminatory wages. Therefore, competitive market forces must drive prejudice from the market such that the relationship between social attitudes and gender pay gaps disappears in the long run (Arrow 1972 ).
However, a number of recent theoretical papers argue that gender pay gaps can persist if markets are not perfectly competitive (e.g., Black 1995; Hirsch 2009; Lang and Lehmann 2012; Lang, Manove, and Dickens 2005; Rosén 1997; Rosén 2003; Sasaki 1999) . For example, Black (1995) and Rosén (1997) develop equilibrium search models with prejudiced employers, who reduce outside options for all minority workers by influencing the number or quality of outside offers. If market frictions prevent the full segregation of the labor market, prejudiced firms survive and reduce women's outside options. As a consequence, gender pay gaps persist, because non-prejudiced employers also gain rents by paying discriminatory wages. Thus if markets are not perfectly competitive, all firms benefit by paying relatively lower wages for females than for males in regions where more people oppose gender equality rights.
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Although no study has shown whether firms adjust their pay-setting to their local discriminatory environment, a number of papers have provided evidence suggesting that gender pay gaps persist if firms have monopsony power and if search frictions are larger for women than for men (Bhaskar, Manning, and To 2002; Boal and Ransom 1997; Hirsch 2009; Hirsch et al. 2010; Manning 2008; Robinson 1969). 3 Moreover, another related strand of the literature focuses on frictions in the product market to explain the persistence of discriminatory pay gaps. The main argument of this literature is that 2 Rosén (2003) presents a similar model in which prejudiced managers sacrifice their personal rents to discriminate against minority workers. Lang and Lehmann (2012) and Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005) show that market frictions can lead to large discriminatory pay gaps, even if the market has only few prejudiced employers. 3 Many of these papers rely on the idea that all firms, not only prejudiced ones, maximize profits if they exploit their monopsony power and discriminate against women if markets are not perfectly competitive.
higher levels of discrimination persist because the lack of product market competition and barriers of entry allows more discriminatory employers to continue to operate. A few studies have tested this hypothesis. For example, Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (2002) find that discrimination against women persists if firms have product market power. In particular, they argue that wages should reflect only gender-specific productivity differences in the absence of discrimination. Therefore, firms that employ relatively more women should not earn higher profits. In contrast, finding evidence that firms with relatively more female employees earn higher profits is consistent with gender discrimination. They find that among plants with high levels of product market power, those that employ relatively more women are relatively more productive. Other related papers find evidence for a negative correlation between product market concentration and a firm's employment of women (e.g., Ashenfelter and Hannan 1986 ).
Customer and coworker discrimination
Social prejudices towards gender equality may not only produce prejudiced employers or managers. Coworkers and customers may also be more prejudiced if social attitudes oppose gender equality rights. Thus firms that operate in regions where more people oppose gender equality rights may have additional costs, because male workers refuse to work with women or because prejudiced customers do not want to buy goods from women. Unlike employer discrimination, employee and customer discrimination directly translates into workers' pay and leaves firms' profitability unaffected, i.e. competitive forces do not eliminate discriminatory pay gaps in the long run. In sum, if social attitudes toward gender equality stipulate prejudices of coworkers and customers, firms may have larger pay gaps in regions where more people have discriminatory social attitudes and oppose gender equality rights 4 .
Individual preferences
Social prejudices may not only produce prejudiced employers, coworkers, or customers; social prejudices may also directly influence the preferences and the stereotypical behavior of individuals. For example, a number of studies show gender-specific preferences for human capital investments and job choices (e.g., Bender, Donohue, and Heywood 2005; Blau and Kahn 2000; Blau and Kahn 2006; Brown and Corcoran 1997; Buser, Niederle, and Oosterbeek 2014; Clark 1997; Donohue and Heywood 2004; Konrad, Ritchie, Lieb, and Corrigall 2000; Sloane and Williams 2000) . If social attitudes towards gender equality amplify the stereotypical behavior of women and men, social attitudes may directly influence the labor supply of individual workers (Akerlof and Kranton 2000) .
First, fewer women may apply for stereotypically male jobs if more people oppose gender equality rights. Second, social attitudes against gender equality may detain women from undertaking large human capital investments, an undertaking essential for good performance in high-paying jobs. Third, social expectations may influence women's decision to withdraw entirely from the labor market (e.g., Charles, Guryan, and Pan 2009; Fernandez 2011; Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti 2004; Fortin 2005; ) . Fourth, social attitudes may influence how women and men negotiate their salaries (e.g., Barron 2003; Major 1994 ).
Thus social attitudes may influence the behavior and relative productivity of women and men and, therefore, the way in which women and men sort into jobs, or the way in which firms assign women and men to different positions. As for customer and employee discrimination, competitive market forces will not eliminate the direct influence of social attitudes towards the preferences of women and men. Therefore, firms may have larger pay gaps in regions where more people oppose gender equality rights.
II. Estimation strategy
Our estimations are based on the following regression equation:
where denotes a firm with more than one local establishment in more than two distinct regions . All regions are characterized by different levels of social attitudes towards gender equality expressed as voter approval rates . describes regional pay differences affecting the pay of all individuals . is a firm-specific match component. The coefficient ! measures general gender differences in pay, which are equal across all firms and regions. For example, ! may describe general gender-specific productivity differences, or countrywide discrimination against women. is a normally distributed error term. ! is the effect of main interest. Because we include firm fixed-effects, ! measures the within-firm correlation between voter approval rates and gender pays gaps.
If firms with generally larger gender pay gaps cluster mainly around regions where more people oppose gender equality rights, or mostly hire high paid men in regions with less discriminatory attitudes and low paid women in regions with more discriminatory attitudes, the coefficient estimate of ! in (1) may pick up these sorting effects. To investigate whether those types of sorting mechanisms explain the relationship between social attitudes and firms'
gender pay gaps, we additionally estimate equation (2), which is essentially equation (1) augmented by interaction terms between the gender dummy and firm fixed effects:
If the described sorting mechanisms were to account for the relationship between social attitudes and gender equality rights, we expect a , ≠ 0 and coefficient estimates of ! to be smaller in (2) than in (1).
If social attitudes indeed lead women and men to differently invest in human capital or sort in different jobs and occupations, observable job and worker characteristics should account for a large part of the relationship between voter approval rates and gender pay gaps. Therefore, we augment equation (1) by different job, and individual worker characteristics.
If job and individual characteristics were to account for much of the within-firm relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and gender pay gaps, we would expect the
Because we analyze firms with establishments in different regions, our observations are grouped in non-nested clusters of firms and regions. If we were not to account for this clustering, we might massively underestimate standard errors, and consequently over-reject standard hypothesis tests, even if we clustered the standard errors at the regional level.
Therefore, we follow Cameron and Miller (2010) and estimate standard errors that account for non-nested clustering at the firm and the regional levels. To ensure that the covariance matrix has full rank, we partial out the control variables.
III. Data
This section describes our data sets in detail. The first subsection describes the voting data, and the second subsection presents our data on the firms.
The voting data
We measure social attitudes towards gender equality by using voter approval rates across different regions, i.e., cantons, in Switzerland. More specifically, we use information on votes on two amendments of the Swiss constitution with regard to gender equality. First, we follow Lalive and Stutzer (2010) and use voting data on an amendment to the Swiss constitution on equal rights for women and men from 1981. However, this vote took place more than 10 years before the observation period of our firm data, and even though we expect that social attitudes change slowly over time, we cannot be certain that social attitudes do not change over the course of more than 20 years. The 1980s in particular was a period of substantial progress towards more gender equality in both the labor market and society in general. Such changes would be problematic for the interpretation of our results if the relative regional structure of social attitudes had changed substantially. For example, regional specific immigration from other countries might alter social attitudes towards gender equality in specific regions.
Therefore, we also use information on regional votes on the 2000 amendment to the Swiss constitution on a fair representation of women in the federal government bodies, both legal and administrative. To clarify our strategy and provide the necessary background, we now present (a) more detailed information on the amendments to the Swiss constitution and (b) some descriptive statistics for both votes.
In 1981, Swiss voters had to decide whether to amend the Swiss constitution to reflect not only the equality of human beings in general but the equality of women and men in particular.
More specifically, the amendment to the Swiss constitution contained the following clauses:
• "Men and women have equal rights."
• "Men and women have equal rights and duties in the family."
• "Men and women are entitled to equal pay for equal work."
• "Men and women are entitled to equal treatment and equal opportunities in education, schooling and vocational education, in employment and occupation."
We argue that the regional voter approval rates provide a measure for identifying social attitudes towards gender equality. Although we observe regional variation in social attitudes, the Swiss constitution applies to all regions. In other words, cantons whose voters rejected the amendment nonetheless have the legal obligation to abide by it. Therefore, the amendment has no legal consequences that differ across regions and, therefore, can be considered as an appropriate measure for social attitudes.
We use data on votes from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office on the equal rights amendment across the 26 Swiss cantons on June 14, 1981. 6 Overall, 60.3% of the voters favored the constitutional amendment, and 39.7% rejected it. Table 1 provides the voting results separately by canton.
- Table 1 about here-
The variation across cantons is substantial. While in Appenzell Inner Rhodes only about 30%
of the voting population approved the amendment on equal rights, in Geneva more than 80%
of the voting population approved it. In urban areas such as Zurich, the economic capital of Switzerland, only slightly more than 60% approved the amendment.
As both women and men participated in the voting, the approval rates should represent the opinion of both women and men within each region. Although actual voter approval rates for women and men are not available, given the anonymity of the ballot box, Table 2 shows the results of a post-vote survey on the voting behavior of women and men. Table 1 .
- Table 2 about hereFor example, in the real vote on the amendment, the cantonal approval rate was highest in Geneva at 85.2%, and the VoxIt data also shows Geneva with the highest approval rate, at 88.6%. St. Gallen and Aargau show low approval rates of 46.3% and 52.1%, respectively, in the real vote and relatively low approval rates of 63.4% and 68.4% in the VoxIt survey. As overall approval rates are almost always higher in the post-vote survey than in the real voting outcomes, the data supports survey data is being subject to a desirability bias. Nevertheless, the relative outcomes of both data sets are surprisingly similar.
An important outcome of the post-vote survey is that women's votes quite strongly match men's votes. Women have the lowest approval rates in St. Gallen and Aargau, whereas they have the highest approval rates in Geneva and Zurich. Therefore, the post-vote survey provides some additional indication that the votes proxy social attitudes that manifest in both women's and men's preferences in a particular region.
For our second measure for social attitudes, we use information on regional votes on the 2000 amendment to the Swiss constitution on a fair representation of women in all official federal bodies. The amendment stated that women should be fairly represented in all federal bodies, both legal (e.g., the parliament, the federal council and the federal court) and administrative (e.g., the federal administration, state owned and operated enterprises, and universities). As with the information for the vote on gender equality in the labor market, the data for the votes about the fair representation amendment comes from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
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Although the two amendments differ in content, both cover an issue related to social attitudes towards gender equality. Specifically, we plausibly assume that the population's general feeling about gender equality affects both amendments in similar ways. Even if the absolute voting outcomes might not be comparable across the two amendments, the information nevertheless helps us clearly identify whether relative differences in social attitudes towards gender equality determine differences in the gender pay gap across regions. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on the voting outcome. In contrast to the amendment on gender equality, most Swiss voters (82.0% ) rejected the amendment on the fair representation of women in the federal government. Nevertheless, the patterns across regions are very similar to those for the 1981 amendment. Therefore, the results indicate that the relative structure of social attitudes has not changed across cantons over time.
- Table 3 about here- (table 1) . For example, Geneva has the highest approval rate for both amendments, whereas Appenzell Inner Rodes has the lowest. To clarify this relationship, Figure 1 compares the voting results for both amendments. The graph shows a strong positive relationship between both amendments, with a correlation between both variables of 87.11%.
Thus the results strongly suggest that the relative structure of social attitudes did not change substantially over more than two decades.
The firm data
Our firm data stems from the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey (ESS), a survey covering a large number of firms. The ESS is based on two-level sampling (i.e., both firms and workers) and selects the firms from the Swiss "business and enterprise" register. This data is representative of all economic sectors except agriculture. The survey does not cover firms with fewer than 3 employees, nor does it provide information on trainees, apprentices, or workers who are paid only on commissions. Firms with fewer than 20 employees are required to report all employees. Firms with 20 and 50 employees are allowed to report only every second employee, and firms with more than 50 employees are allowed to report every third employee. However, the firms are required to select their reported workers randomly. The ESS has been conducted in biennially repeated cross-sections since 1994, and participation for firms is compulsory.
To identify multiple establishments of firms across cantons, we need information on workers' administrative cantonal districts. As the EES provides such information only for 1994 through 1998, we restrict our sample to that period. Unfortunately, the data only allows us to identify different establishments if they are located in different cantonal regions. Multiple establishments located in the same region appear in the data source as a single establishment.
This restriction, however, is not decisive for the main focus of our analysis, i.e., to analyze the relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and firms' pay-setting behavior.
At the firm level, we restrict our sample to companies in the private sector with establishments in more than one canton. To ensure that we can measure a gender pay gap within each establishment, we require that every establishment in our sample contains information about at least two employees and at least one woman and one man. Additionally, we exclude all agricultural firms because the observations in our data are not representative for this sector. Moreover, some firms report different industry categorizations for establishments in different regions. We drop those firms from the sample. Given these restrictions, we have to drop the small canton Appenzell Inner Rhodes from our sample, as none of the establishments there match our restrictions.
At the employee level, we restrict the sample to full-time workers (i.e., workers with more than 30 working hours per week) who were older than 16 when they entered the firm and younger than 65 at the time of the survey. We only incorporate full-time workers in our analysis because part-time workers are likely to differ from full-time workers in terms of their unobserved productivity. Part-time working women in particular are likely to follow a very different career path than full-time working men. We are aware that this restriction is somewhat strong and that it excludes more women from our sample than men. However, our results do not change even when we use the entire sample of workers; indeed, the magnitude of the coefficient estimates becomes even bigger. Nevertheless, as we do not want to capture a part-time effect in our results, we present only the results for the restricted sample of fulltime workers in this paper. Results for the unrestricted sample are available upon request. Table 4 shows an overview of the observations of the restricted sample.
- Table 4 about here-
The restriction to employees without missing information for the included variables leaves us with 332,087 employees, of whom 109,058 are women and 223,029 are men. In total, we observe 1277 firms with 4457 establishments. Most firms in our sample have about four establishments in different cantons, with a maximum of 25-i.e., some firms have establishments in every canton included in our sample.
We use the following variables in our investigation: Workers' pay is measured as the standardized sum of gross monthly wages. This pay measure includes an employee's contribution to social insurance, payment in kind, regularly paid-out participation in sales and bonuses, and compensation for shift-and night-work. In addition, thirteen months of payments or yearly special payments are included pro rata. Although inflation in Switzerland is not high, we adjust wages according to the National Consumer Price Index. We obtain the workers' education in categories and convert them in years of education according to Wirz (2008) . We have a measure for workers' years of tenure and weekly working hours. We know whether workers are covered by a union contract and whether they are married. We can observe the workers' occupation in twenty-four categories and create five dummies for the workers' job position, ranging from no-management to upper management.
Descriptive statistics appear in Table 5 for all workers and for women and men separately.
About 30% of our sample is female. Average weekly working hours are around 40. Men earn about 0.30 log points more than females. Men also have slightly more education, and their average tenure is about 3 years higher than that of women. While we find no large difference in the weekly working hours of men and women, men are substantially more often married and are more likely to hold a management position. This difference is most striking in top and upper management.
- Table 5 about here-
IV. Results
In the first subsection, before we turn to our main analysis investigating the relationship between voter approval rates and gender pay gaps, we analyze whether social attitudes towards gender equality influence how women and men sort into different firms or whether firms hire and assign women and men to different jobs within firms.
In the second subsection, we present our main estimates for the within-firm relationship between voter approval rates and gender pay gaps. Although we cannot present causal evidence for the relationship between voter approval rates and gender pay gaps, this subsection carefully discusses various mechanisms for explaining the relationship and presents evidence for different subsamples and industries. The third subsection shows estimates of the same type for a subsample of workers for whom we are able to observe their time-based and their performance pay component. studies showing that social attitudes influence women's labor force participation.
The effect of social attitudes towards job and firm segregation
- Table 6 about hereAfter we account for firm-fixed effects in the second specification of Table 6 , the point estimate decreases substantially and the effect turns insignificant. Thus the results suggest that regional social attitudes towards gender equality influence how women and men sort between but not within firms.
The third and fourth columns of Table 6 present similar OLS regressions of voter approval rates on the Duncan index on the establishment level. The Duncan index, a common measure for occupational segregation, can be interpreted as the percentage of women who would have to change occupations to achieve an occupational distribution similar to men. On average about 40 percent of women within the average establishment had to change occupation to achieve a distribution similar to men. Column three shows a negative coefficient estimate of voter approval rates, indicating that establishments are more segregated in socially more prejudiced regions. Although the point estimate is not particularly small, the effect is not significant. If we account for firm fixed effects, the point estimate decreases substantially. In summary, the results suggest that regional social attitudes towards gender equality influence how women and men sort between but not within firms. Table 7 investigates the relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and different individual outcome variables. The estimates stem from regressions of a female dummy, a continuous measure for voter approval rates, and an interaction term between both variables. All regressions contain region and firm fixed effects. Standard errors account for non-nested clustering.
The first column presents estimates from a regression on years of education. The second column presents a linear probability model, where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether an individual holds a management position or not. The third column describes a specification where the dependent variable is a measure for the average log pay within each occupation, for inferring whether women and men select into jobs with different pay levels. The fourth column shows the relationship between voter approval rates and the gender-specific probability of receiving performance pay.
As none of the interaction terms between voter approval rates and the gender dummy is significant, the results do not indicate that social attitudes have a strong influence on how firms assign women and men to different jobs within firms.
- Table 7 about here -
The effect of social attitudes towards gender pay gaps
Figure 2 graphically shows a regression of regional firm-internal gender pay gaps and the average regional approval rates in Switzerland. Specifically, the results in the figure stem from the following two-step procedure: First, using all observation, we predict gender pay gaps for each canton. As our interest lies in investigating the differences in gender pay gaps within firms, we account for firm fixed effects in the first stage. Second, we regress these predicted pay gaps on the regional shares of voter approval rates by collapsing the data to the 25 observations at the cantonal level. To take into account that the gender pay gaps are estimated with varying precision, we weight each of the 25 observations by the inverse of the coefficient variance of the first-stage regression.
- Figure 2 about here -
The figure suggests that the average gender pay gap is smaller in establishments in regions where more voters approved the equality rights amendment than in regions where fewer voters approved the equality rights amendment. More specifically, the gender pay gap is on average about 0.10 log points smaller in establishments in regions where about 80% of voters approved the equal rights amendment than in establishments located in regions where only about 40% did. The R-squared of this regression amounts to 0.449, indicating that more than half of the variation of gender pay gaps can be attributed to changes in voter approval rates.
However, the previous procedure does not display the within-firm effect of voter approval rates on gender pay gaps. Therefore, in the following analysis, we show the results of various specifications of equation (1) for the entire sample of observed workers. As mentioned in the data section, the amendment for gender-specific equality rights took place in 1981-more than 10 years before our observation period. Therefore, in the second specification we replace the voting data on the 1981 amendment with voting data from the 2000 amendment for a fair representation of women in federal governmental bodies. The second column of Table 8 If firms with generally larger pay gaps sort into regions where more people oppose gender equality rights, and firms with smaller pay gaps sort into regions where fewer people oppose gender equality rights, our coefficient of main interest would pick up this firm sorting effect.
Moreover, if firms generally hire many low-paid women in regions where more people oppose gender equality rights, our coefficient would also pick up this sorting effect. The third column of Table 8 shows the results of regression equation (2), which includes interaction terms between the gender dummy and firm fixed effects. The coefficient estimate of the interaction term between the female dummy and voter approval rates does not change substantially. Nonetheless, the standard error in third specification is almost twice the size of the standard error in the first specification, because we added 1276 dummy variables.
The other potential explanation for finding a connection between social attitudes and firms' gender pay gaps is regional differences of women's labor supply or human capital investment.
Therefore, the remaining three specifications stem from regression equation (3) and successively add further control variables to the regression. The fourth column of Table 8 shows that the inclusion of occupational dummies only modestly reduces the coefficient estimates of both variables. Therefore, occupational segregation appears not to be the major mechanism by which social attitudes influence the pay-setting behavior of firms.
The fifth specification examines how worker's job positions mitigate the relationship between voter approval rates and gender pay differentials. The job position is measured in five categories ranging from no management position to high and upper management position.
The fifth column of Table 8 presents the results. After the inclusion of the dummies for the worker's job position, the magnitude of the average isolated gender pay gap decreases to about 36%. In contrast, the coefficient estimate of the interaction term between approval rates and the gender dummy increases slightly and now amounts to 0.257.
The sixth specification investigates to what extent observable individual worker characteristics mitigate the relationship between regional approval rates and firm-internal pay gaps. Therefore, we add variables for tenure, tenure squared, entry age, entry age squared, union, marital status, and years of education to the regression equation. To account for the gender specific effects of the workers' entry age on wages, we also interact the entry age variable with the gender dummy. The sixth column of Table 8 presents the results.
We find substantial effects of observable worker characteristics on the isolated gender pay gap, i.e., the coefficient of the female dummy indicating the isolated gender pay gap drops by about 0.12 log points, from 0.360 to about 0.235. The coefficient estimate of the interaction term between voter approval rates and the gender dummy also drops from about 0.257 log points to about 0.181. As particularly observable worker characteristics appear to mitigate the within-firm relationship between voter approval rate and gender pay gaps, we cannot rule out the possibility that regional social attitudes towards gender equality are related to unobserved regional gender-specific productivity differences, which persist even for women and men who work in the same jobs and firms.
Nonetheless, even if we account for observable productivity related worker characteristics, the connection between firms' gender pay gaps and regional variation in voter approval rates remains relatively large and robust. Therefore, we cannot reject the possibility that regional differences in pay discrimination constitute the relationship between voter approval rates and the gender pay gap. On the one hand, local employers or managers may be more discriminatory in regions where more people oppose gender equality rights. On the other hand, more prejudiced customers and coworkers may populate more prejudiced regions and lead firms to adjust women's wages downward.
Some industries are characterized by strong product market concentration, while other industries require workers to have close customer contact. Therefore, analyzing the relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and gender pay gaps by different industry categories may shed some light on mechanism behind this relationship. Table 9 presents the estimates by industry categories. The table shows the within-firm estimates of equation (1) for the following broad industry categories: manufacturing, commerce (including wholesale and retail), credit and banking, and a remainder category ("other"), containing firms in all remaining (smaller) industries in our sample. To test whether the effects differ by industry, we used third-order interaction terms between the industry dummy, the gender pay gap, and voter approval rates and the corresponding second-order interaction between all relevant variables.
- Table 9 about hereWe find the largest point estimate for the manufacturing sector (0.339 log points), directly followed by the commerce sector (0.213 log points). Although the two coefficient estimates are not significantly different from one another, they are both significantly larger than the point estimates for the banking sector (0.160 log points) and the remainder industries (0.046 log points).
The manufacturing sector in Switzerland is characterized by high market concentration, suggesting that firms in that sector have high product market power. Rutz (2013) indeed calculates Herfindal-Hirschman indices (HHI) of up to 720 for some manufacturing industries. In contrast, the HHI for the wholesale and commerce sectors only amounts to 114, and the credit sector has a HHI of 94. Moreover, capital intensities are substantially larger in the manufacturing sector than in all other sectors of Swiss industry, suggesting high barriers to entry for the manufacturing sector. Therefore, the results are consistent with the results of Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske (2002) , who find stronger gender discrimination for firms with product market power.
Time-based vs. performance pay
In this subsection, we analyze a subsample of workers whose pay consists of a performance pay and a time-based pay component, because social attitudes towards gender equality could have different effects on workers' performance pay component than on their time-based pay component. We now discuss the four most important reasons for such differences. The first two theories suggest more discrimination in the performance pay than in the time-based pay component. The last two theories suggest less discrimination in the performance than in the time-based pay component.
First, if performance pay components are tied to workers' productivity according to objective quantity measures and fixed rules, differences in performance pay components must reflect productivity differences. Consequently, managers face more difficulties in discriminating Second, gender-specific differences in salary negotiations may result in a different effect for performance and time-based pay. A number of studies show that women perform worse in salary negotiations than men. If social attitudes towards gender equality amplify the genderspecific bargaining behavior, gender pay gaps may be larger under time-based pay than under performance pay, even if managers do not discriminate against women.
Third, if performance pay is based on the subjective evaluation of discriminatory managers, managers may even discriminate more under performance pay than under time-based pay.
Fourth, if performance pay is based on sales commission and customer discrimination matters, the relationship between social attitudes and gender pay gaps could also be stronger in the performance component than in time-based component.
We therefore analyze a subsample of workers for whom we are able to observe a time-based pay component, which is based only on the contractual working hours, and a performance pay component, which includes bonus payments, gratification, and profit sharing. Unfortunately, for workers who are regularly paid by commission and piece rates, we are not able to distinguish the workers' performance pay component from the workers' time-based pay component. After we remove those workers from the sample of performance pay workers, 88,742 individual workers remain (table 10 ).
- Table 10 about hereThirty percent of the restricted sample of performance pay workers is female. Thus the distribution of women and men appears similar to that in the entire sample of workers. The time-based component of workers with performance pay is on average about 0.10 log points higher than the wages for the entire sample of the workers. This result holds for both women and men. The raw gender pay gap in time-based pay is about 0.25 log points and 0.35 log points for the performance pay component. Tables 11 and 12 present the results. Table 11 shows the results for the time-based pay component. Table 12 shows the results for the performance pay component for those same workers.
- Table 11 about here -- Table 12 about here -
The first specification of Table 11 shows the results without further control variables. The results show an isolated gender pay gap for the time-based pay component of about 0.394 log points. This value is very similar to the estimates from the entire sample in Table 8 .
The result of main interest-the coefficient estimate of the interaction term between the female dummy and the voter approval rate-shows a positive significant estimate for the time-based pay component. The effect is with 0.174 log points slightly smaller than the effect for the entire sample (table 8) . One possible explanation is that women working under performance pay are more competitive or more focused on their career, so that the gender pay gap is somewhat smaller for performance pay workers-even in the time-based pay component.
The first specification of Table 12 shows the same results for the performance pay component of those same workers. In contrast to the previous results for the time-based pay component, we do not find a significant effect of the interaction term on the performance pay component. Tables 11 and 12 replaces the voting data on the 1981 amendment with the voting data of the 2000 amendment. The results are qualitatively similar to those in specification I Specification III incorporates all controls for observable job and worker characteristics, and shows a substantial reduction of the isolated gender pay gap for both the workers' performance pay and time-based pay component. In contrast, the coefficient estimate of the interaction term between the female dummy and the regional approval rate decreases only slightly for the time-based pay component, whereas the same interaction term remains insignificant for the performance pay component.
Specification II of
As previously argued, the nature of performance pay may differ strongly according to workers' jobs and sectors, e.g., workers may receive high subjective bonus payments in the banking sector, sales bonuses in commerce, or bonus payments for reaching productivity targets in the manufacturing sector. Therefore, Tables 13 and 14 present separate estimates for the four broad industry categories (manufacturing, commerce, credit, and others) for the workers' time-based pay component and performance pay component.
- Table 13 about here -- Table 14 about here - Table 13 shows the results for the time-based pay component. The point estimates for the manufacturing and commerce sector are large and significantly different from zero and also significantly different from the coefficient estimate of the remainder industries. The point estimate for banking and the remaining category for all other industries are small and not significantly different from zero. Table 14 shows the results for performance pay. The most striking finding is the positive significant point estimate for the commerce sector. The payment of commerce workers may be more strongly related to their customer contact than in other sectors. In particular, if commerce workers are more likely to receive sales bonuses than other workers, the strong relationship between voter approval rates and the gender pay gap in the performance pay component may indicate that regional differences in customer discrimination drive the relationship between voter approval rates and gender pay gaps in this sector.
The results of Tables 13 and 14 support our assumption that social attitudes may have different effects on workers' time-based and performance pay components. For example, managers may face more difficulties in discriminating against female manufacturing workers in their performance pay, because manufacturing workers produce output, which can be easily quantified. In contrast, in commerce it may be the customers who-because of their discriminatory social attitudes-want to discriminate against female workers, in which case the females' performance pay component could be strongly related to social attitudes towards gender equality.
V. Discussion and conclusion
We combine information on regional variation in social attitudes towards gender equality with a large data set of multi-establishment firms and workers to analyze the relationship between these social attitudes and firms' gender pay gaps. Therefore, we are able to observe the same firms under the influences of regional differences in social attitudes towards gender equality.
Even after we account for unobserved firm heterogeneity, we find a strong relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and gender pay gaps. In other words, the relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and gender pay gaps remains, even after we take into account the possibility that social attitudes may lead women and men to segregate into entirely different firms. Thus the results show that firms pay more discriminatory wages in regions where more people have discriminatory social attitudes.
Our results are consistent with different theories on the relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and gender pay gaps. First, discriminatory social attitudes could shape the self-image of women and men towards a more stereotypical role model, with men being the breadwinner and women being responsible for the household, so that discriminatory social attitudes lead women to sort into entirely different jobs, invest less in education, or exert less effort on the job, even if working in the same jobs and firms as men. Consequently, regional gender-specific productivity differences would then account for large shares of the relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and gender pay gaps. However, if regional-specific productivity differences alone accounted for the relationship between social attitudes towards gender equality and gender pay gaps, supply side variables and workers characteristics should mitigate the relationship in a substantial way. But the results remain robust if we account for detailed worker and job characteristics, and we find no evidence that social attitudes towards gender equality influence how firms assign women and men to different jobs and occupations across regions.
Second, discriminatory social attitudes could lead prejudiced employers with a taste for discrimination to offer different employment options to women than to men, i.e., women receive fewer and worse job opportunities than men and have more difficulties finding equal employment under discriminatory social attitudes. If market frictions exist, all firms, both prejudiced and non-prejudiced, could then benefit by not raising women's wages to their marginal productivity (e.g., Black 1995; Lang and Lehmann 2012; Lang, Manove, and Dickens 2005; Rosén 1997; Rosén 2003; Sasaki 1999) . Consequently, all firms have incentives to pay lower wages to women in regions where more people oppose gender equality rights than in regions where fewer people do. As we find a strong correlation of a within-firm gender wage gap with the discriminatory attitudes in the region in which each establishment is located, our results are consistent with the theory of employer discrimination in non-competitive markets. This is particularly so because the strongest relationship between social attitudes and gender pay gaps lies in the manufacturing sector, for which product market concentration and barriers to entry are the highest in Switzerland.
Third, our results are also consistent with the idea of coworker and customer discrimination, because coworkers and customers may be more prejudiced in regions where more people oppose gender equality rights enough so that firms have larger pay gaps in those regions. As we find the strongest relationship between voter approval rates and gender pay gaps in the performance pay of commerce workers, who have a lot of customer interaction, we conclude that customers' discriminatory attitudes may be particularly important for workers in the commerce sector.
However, a limitation of our study is that in the end we cannot fully distinguish among the different theories that we discussed. To do so, we would need more detailed information on the actual behavior and decision-making of employers and customers but, unfortunately, such data is not available. This limitation notwithstanding, our paper provides an important new insight into understanding the role of firms in the relationship between social attitudes and gender pay gaps. [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] . The voting data stem from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Non-nested standard errors are calculated at the region and firm level. * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. ♮ Significantly different from "commerce" at 5% level; Significantly different from "banking" at the 5% level;
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